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ESSAY

WHY AN ACCEPTABLE CLONING POLICY
WILL BE HARD TO ACHIEVE
JOHN ROBINSON*

As my contribution to today's discussion on cloning policy, I
would like to call attention to one feature of that discussion, a
feature that will make it very difficult for our legislatures and for
our courts to arrive at a cloning policy that will be acceptable to
more than a handful of two participants in that discussion. The
feature that I have in mind is the deep diversity that exists among
the discussants, a diversity so deep that on several points it will
not only be difficult for them to reach agreement; it also will be
difficult for them to understand each other at all. To illustrate
what I mean, I ask the reader to visualize cloning policy for the
moment as the product of four different sorts of inputs: scientific, political, religious, and financial. The following is one form
that such a visualization might take:

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame. This is an edited
version of remarks that Professor Robinson made at a conference on cloning
and the law, sponsored by the Notre Dame Alumni Association, in Washington,
D.C. in November of 1998.
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My basic claim today is that it will be immensely difficult for
these four inputs to flow together in the production of acceptable cloning policy. Let me take a few minutes to explain why that
is so.

Turn first to the "science" circle. Imagine if you can that
there is such a thing as a (or the) scientific community. If (or
insofar as) such a community exists or could come into existence, it is (or would be) uniquely planetary. For such a community, that Dolly.was cloned in Scotland is a matter of complete
indifference. She mightjust as well have been cloned in Cambodia or in Cameroon. In such a community, the theory behind
the cloning of Dolly and the technique required to effect it is
available to each of its members almost immediately, and efforts
at replication begin as soon as the theory and technique are available. The members of this community share a capacity for
understanding the theory and implementing the technique that
distinguishes them from the great mass of their compatriots and
they share standards of scientific rigor that allowed them to confirm Dolly's bona fides as a clone just about as quickly as they had
been able, a few years ago, to reject cold fusion as, at best, an
illusion. Information transfer within the scientific community
now takes place more rapidly and more thoroughly than ever
before, and the time it takes for theoretical breakthroughs to
produce technological improvements has been vastly reduced as
a result-as your calculator, cell phone, or laptop reveals. One
could almost say that the scientific community has achieved a
level of orthodoxy (and an ability to police heterodoxy) not
known in the West, at least, since Martin Luther posted his
ninety-five theses on the door of the Cathedral in Wittenburg
almost five hundred years ago.
So remarkable have been the achievements of science in
recent centuries, and so startling has been the rate of scientific
advance in recent decades, that even scientists themselves have
sometimes succumbed to the temptation to think of science and
its methods as having some sort of ultimacy with respect to matters of meaning and morals, as if any dispute that did not lend
itself to scientific resolution was not a legitimate dispute at all.
Disputes of that sort, it is sometimes thought, are best relegated
to a private sphere, where the disputants can have at each other
as harmlessly, and as ineffectually, as possible.
It should be clear from the description I have just given that
any attribution of ultimacy to science with regard to what ought
to be done is profoundly wrong-headed. Not only is it true that
science as science has precious little to say about how we should
live, but scientists themselves have a distressingly poor track rec-
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ord with respect to recognizing any moral constraints on their
activities. Even the choice of Dolly as a name suggests that those
who named her have not yet come to terms with sexism as a
moral category. With regard to the cloning debate, we can
expect to hear much more from the scientific community about
the scientific potential of cloning than about the moral issues it
raises, and virtually nothing from the scientific community about
how those moral issues should be resolved.
Proceed now to the "religion" circle in the visualization that
I proposed earlier. Under one understanding of the great settlement agreed to here and in Western Europe two centuries ago,
there should be no religious circle at all in the cloning debate.
On this understanding, to let religion influence policy is to violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, if not in
fact at least in spirit. Such an understanding, however, must be
rejected if only in order to bestow some seriousness on the cloning debate itself. That debate becomes serious only if opponents
of cloning can articulate arguments against it that have at least as
much intellectual force as do the arguments for cloning made by
its proponents. And where, outside of our religious communities, are we likely to find the conceptual resources adequate to
the critique of the morality of as considerable a scientific achievement as cloning? Nowhere-so religion must play a role in the
cloning debate or the debate will be a sham.
No sooner do we recognize the necessity of a role for religion in the cloning debate than we are forced to acknowledge
two monumental problems incident to that recognition. The first
of these problems relates to the fragmented nature of religion in
the modern world. The cloning debate is closely related to the
abortion debate-a debate that has revealed, first, how divided
the several Christian confessions are on both the status of the
embryo and on the role of sex in human life, and second, how
much division there is within each of those confessions on those
issues. Efforts at the formation of united fronts on the part of
several confessions often succeed only to the extent that each
party to the front is willing to ignore its own distinctive understanding of the human condition and its own distinctive modus
operandi with respect to disputed moral questions-all in the
interest of having a voice in some great and pressing policy
debate. But this is to throw out the baby in order to save the
bathwater, where the baby is a particular confession's understanding of the human condition and its modus operandi with
respect to moral questions. When these are put to one side, the
vacuum thereby created is quickly filled by the very muddle-
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headed consequentialism that we should hope religion will
contest.
This brings us to the second problem incident to acknowledging the need for the presence of religion in the cloning
debate. This problem stems from the massive disconnect
between science and religion that has characterized their coexistence over the course of the past 350 years. That this disconnect
would never have been as massive as it became if all of the parties
to it had been as conscious of their own limitations and of the
limitations of their position has, I think, been established beyond
any doubt. The somewhat quixotic efforts on the part of the current Pope to right the wrong that the Catholic Church did to
Galileo in the seventeenth century provides some evidence for
this claim, as does the equally quixotic efforts of Pierre Teilhard
de Charden to reconcile evolutionary theory with Christian soteriology a generation ago. It remains true, however, that as a sociological matter, it is the rare scientist (and the still more rare
biologist) who is equally at home in scientific discourse and religious discourse when he or she is addressing the morality of a
scientifically feasible project. It is true, furthermore, as a conceptual and methodological matter, that it is only with the greatest
difficulty that scientific and religious thought mesh once we
leave the plane of high abstractions and descend to the level of
concrete problems. To offer only a single example in defense of
this generalization, I will note how resistant modern scientific
thought has been to efforts to distinguish intended effects from
those that are merely foreseen-a distinction that is crucial to
the functioning of Catholic moral theory.
Consider now the "finance" circle. I must confess at the outset that the label is a lame one. What I am getting at here is the
significant role that money-private money, philanthropic
money, and government money-have played, and will continue
to play, in the development of modern reproductive and
biomedical technology. Because thousands of American couples
for whom intercourse does not result in pregnancy are willing to
invest $7,500 of their own money in in vitro fertilization efforts

that have a one-in-four chance of resulting in a sustainable pregnancy, we have hundreds of IVF clinics and no serious debate
about the propriety of in vitro fertilization procedures. Once the
technology for xenotransplants has been perfected, we can
expect there to come into existence a multi-billion dollar per
year market for hog- and cow-generated kidneys, livers, hearts,
and lungs, and no serious debate about the propriety of xenotransplantation. By parity of reasoning, if (or as) private dollars
are invested in cloning at a level comparable to the current pri-
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vate investment in in vitro fertilization procedures, that level of
investment will both guarantee cloning a central place in the
biomedical research agenda and tend to stifle debate over its
propriety. Financial imperatives will conspire with technological
imperatives to confer upon cloning a societal legitimacy that, as a
moral matter, it will never have earned.
We come, finally, to the "politics" circle, and the first thing I
need to do is to deny its separateness from the other circles.
Only a fool would deny that money talks quite effectively in political assemblies, and the scientific and religious communities
make every effort to have their voice heard and their view prevail
in political deliberations. For those reasons our focus here is on
the political process to the extent that it adds something to the
volatile mix of financial, scientific, and religious contributions to
the cloning debate. When we do this, we are confronted right off
the bat with two crucial problems. We can call the first of those
problems the impotence of government. In the case of cloning (as
opposed to several other projects), it is true both that governmental funding may not be necessary to the success of the project and that governmental prohibition may be unable to prevent
its success. If forty states ban cloning research, the research will
take place in the other ten. If the federal government bans cloning research where the end in view is a cloned human, the
research will move off-shore. The main effect of governmental
efforts to address cloning research may, therefore, be that government-state and federal-plays no effective role in its regulation-surely an outcome that few would desire.
The impotence of government to one side, the political circle faces a much greater problem. Let us call this one the ignorance of government. Here your senator faces the same
difficulties as your bishop. Cloning is hard to understand, as is
stem-cell research and xenotransplantation. Neither your senator nor your bishop is likely to be a biologist and neither are the
people closest to them likely to have much scientific expertise.
But when conscientious legislators look outside of their intimate
circle of advisors for advice on cloning and its regulation, they
are likely to encounter the cacophony that I described previously. Their scientific advisors will be long on technique and
short on moral analysis, and their religious advisors will argue
among themselves on the correct moral approach and be as fuzzy
on specifics as the legislators themselves are.
None of this inspires much confidence with respect to the
law governing cloning research; but all is not lost. We go into
the discussion about cloning and its regulation with no illusions
as to the moral wisdom of the scientific community or as to the
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ease of non-platitudinous scientific-religious exchanges, and
recent history has taught us not to expect either wisdom or heroism from our legislators. Perhaps the collective humility that we
bring to the great cloning debate that lies before us will help us,
after all, to arrive at a cloning regime with which we all can live.

